The Art of Controversy (AKA The Art of Always Being Right)

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Present for those of you that like a good argument, don't use it on me!!

38 points in all, see the link at the bottom for the full text.

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Title: The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; The Art of Controversy

Author: Arthur Schopenhauer

Release Date: January 17, 2004 [eBook #10731]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1

***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER;

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY***

E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Josephine Paolucci, and the Project

Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team

THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: THE ART OF CONTROVERSY

TRANSLATED BY

T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.

CONTENTS.

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY--

1. PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC

2. THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC

3. STRATAGEMS

ON THE COMPARATIVE PLACE OF INTEREST AND BEAUTY IN WORKS OF ART

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS

GENIUS AND VIRTUE

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The volume now before the reader is a tardy addition to a series in

which I have endeavoured to present Schopenhauer's minor writings in

an adequate form.

Its contents are drawn entirely from his posthumous papers. A

selection of them was given to the world some three of four years

after his death by his friend and literary executor, Julius

Frauenstädt, who for this and other offices of piety, has received

less recognition than he deserves. The papers then published have

recently been issued afresh, with considerable additions and

corrections, by Dr. Eduard Grisebach, who is also entitled to

gratitude for the care with which he has followed the text of the

manuscripts, now in the Royal Library at Berlin, and for having drawn

attention--although in terms that are unnecessarily severe--to a

number of faults and failings on the part of the previous editor.

The fact that all Schopenhauer's works, together with a volume of his

correspondence, may now be obtained in a certain cheap collection of

the best national and foreign literature displayed in almost every

bookshop in Germany, is sufficient evidence that in his own country

the writer's popularity is still very great; nor does the demand for

translations indicate that his fame has at all diminished abroad. The

favour with which the new edition of his posthumous papers has been

received induces me, therefore, to resume a task which I thought, five

years ago, that I had finally completed; and it is my intention to

bring out one more volume, selected partly from these papers and

partly from his _Parerga_.

A small part of the essay on _The Art of Controversy_ was published in

Schopenhauer's lifetime, in the chapter of the _Parerga_ headed _Zur

Logik und Dialektik_. The intelligent reader will discover that a good

deal of its contents is of an ironical character. As regards the last

three essays I must observe that I have omitted such passages

as appear to be no longer of any general interest or otherwise

unsuitable. I must also confess to having taken one or two liberties

with the titles, in order that they may the more effectively fulfil

the purpose for which titles exist. In other respects I have adhered

to the original with the kind of fidelity which aims at producing

an impression as nearly as possible similar to that produced by the

original.

T.B.S.

February, 1896

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY.

PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC.

By the ancients, Logic and Dialectic were used as synonymous terms;

although [Greek: logizesthai], "to think over, to consider, to

calculate," and [Greek: dialegesthai], "to converse," are two very

different things.

The name Dialectic was, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, first

used by Plato; and in the _Phaedrus, Sophist, Republic_, bk. vii., and

elsewhere, we find that by Dialectic he means the regular employment

of the reason, and skill in the practice of it. Aristotle also uses

the word in this sense; but, according to Laurentius Valla, he was

the first to use Logic too in a similar way.[1] Dialectic, therefore,

seems to be an older word than Logic. Cicero and Quintilian use the

words in the same general signification.[2]

[Footnote 1: He speaks of [Greek: dyscherelai logicai], that is,

"difficult points," [Greek: protasis logicae aporia logicae]]

[Footnote 2: Cic. _in Lucullo: Dialecticam inventam esse, veri et

falsi quasi disceptatricem. Topica_, c. 2: _Stoici enim judicandi vias

diligenter persecuti sunt, ea scientia, quam_ Dialecticen _appellant_.

Quint., lib. ii., 12: _Itaque haec pars dialecticae, sive illam

disputatricem dicere malimus_; and with him this latter word appears

to be the Latin equivalent for Dialectic. (So far according to "Petri

Rami dialectica, Audomari Talaei praelectionibus illustrata." 1569.)]

This use of the words and synonymous terms lasted through the Middle

Ages into modern times; in fact, until the present day. But more

recently, and in particular by Kant, Dialectic has often been employed

in a bad sense, as meaning "the art of sophistical controversy";

and hence Logic has been preferred, as of the two the more innocent

designation. Nevertheless, both originally meant the same thing; and

in the last few years they have again been recognised as synonymous.

It is a pity that the words have thus been used from of old, and that

I am not quite at liberty to distinguish their meanings. Otherwise, I

should have preferred to define _Logic_ (from [Greek: logos], "word"

and "reason," which are inseparable) as "the science of the laws of

thought, that is, of the method of reason"; and _Dialectic_ (from

[Greek: dialegesthai], "to converse"--and every conversation

communicates either facts or opinions, that is to say, it is

historical or deliberative) as "the art of disputation," in the modern

sense of the word. It it clear, then, that Logic deals with a subject

of a purely _à priori_ character, separable in definition from

experience, namely, the laws of thought, the process of reason or the

[Greek: logos], the laws, that is, which reason follows when it is

left to itself and not hindered, as in the case of solitary thought on

the part of a rational being who is in no way misled. Dialectic, on

the other hand, would treat of the intercourse between two rational

beings who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but

who, as soon as they cease to agree like two clocks keeping exactly

the same time, create a disputation, or intellectual contest. Regarded

as purely rational beings, the individuals would, I say, necessarily

be in agreement, and their variation springs from the difference

essential to individuality; in other words, it is drawn from

experience.

Logic, therefore, as the science of thought, or the science of the

process of pure reason, should be capable of being constructed _à

priori_. Dialectic, for the most part, can be constructed only _à

posteriori_; that is to say, we may learn its rules by an experiential

knowledge of the disturbance which pure thought suffers through the

difference of individuality manifested in the intercourse between

two rational beings, and also by acquaintance with the means which

disputants adopt in order to make good against one another their own

individual thought, and to show that it is pure and objective. For

human nature is such that if A. and B. are engaged in thinking in

common, and are communicating their opinions to one another on any

subject, so long as it is not a mere fact of history, and A. perceives

that B.'s thoughts on one and the same subject are not the same as his

own, he does not begin by revising his own process of thinking, so as

to discover any mistake which he may have made, but he assumes that

the mistake has occurred in B.'s. In other words, man is naturally

obstinate; and this quality in him is attended with certain results,

treated of in the branch of knowledge which I should like to call

Dialectic, but which, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I shall call

Controversial or Eristical Dialectic. Accordingly, it is the branch

of knowledge which treats of the obstinacy natural to man. Eristic is

only a harsher name for the same thing.

Controversial Dialectic is the art of disputing, and of disputing in

such a way as to hold one's own, whether one is in the right or the

wrong--_per fas et nefas_.[1] A man may be objectively in the right,

and nevertheless in the eyes of bystanders, and sometimes in his own,

he may come off worst. For example, I may advance a proof of some

assertion, and my adversary may refute the proof, and thus appear to

have refuted the assertion, for which there may, nevertheless, be

other proofs. In this case, of course, my adversary and I change

places: he comes off best, although, as a matter of fact, he is in the

wrong.

[Footnote 1: According to Diogenes Laertius, v., 28, Aristotle put

Rhetoric and Dialectic together, as aiming at persuasion, [Greek: to

pithanon]; and Analytic and Philosophy as aiming at truth. Aristotle

does, indeed, distinguish between (1) _Logic_, or Analytic, as the

theory or method of arriving at true or apodeictic conclusions; and

(2) _Dialectic_ as the method of arriving at conclusions that are

accepted or pass current as true, [Greek: endoxa] _probabilia_;

conclusions in regard to which it is not taken for granted that they

are false, and also not taken for granted that they are true in

themselves, since that is not the point. What is this but the art of

being in the right, whether one has any reason for being so or not, in

other words, the art of attaining the appearance of truth, regardless

of its substance? That is, then, as I put it above.

Aristotle divides all conclusions into logical and dialectical, in the

manner described, and then into eristical. (3) _Eristic_ is the method

by which the form of the conclusion is correct, but the premisses, the

materials from which it is drawn, are not true, but only appear to be

true. Finally (4) _Sophistic_ is the method in which the form of the

conclusion is false, although it seems correct. These three last

properly belong to the art of Controversial Dialectic, as they have

no objective truth in view, but only the appearance of it, and pay

no regard to truth itself; that is to say, they aim at victory.

Aristotle's book on _Sophistic Conclusions_ was edited apart from the

others, and at a later date. It was the last book of his _Dialectic_.]

If the reader asks how this is, I reply that it is simply the

natural baseness of human nature. If human nature were not base, but

thoroughly honourable, we should in every debate have no other aim

than the discovery of truth; we should not in the least care whether

the truth proved to be in favour of the opinion which we had begun by

expressing, or of the opinion of our adversary. That we should

regard as a matter of no moment, or, at any rate, of very secondary

consequence; but, as things are, it is the main concern. Our

innate vanity, which is particularly sensitive in reference to our

intellectual powers, will not suffer us to allow that our first

position was wrong and our adversary's right. The way out of this

difficulty would be simply to take the trouble always to form a

correct judgment. For this a man would have to think before he spoke.

But, with most men, innate vanity is accompanied by loquacity and

innate dishonesty. They speak before they think; and even though they

may afterwards perceive that they are wrong, and that what they assert

is false, they want it to seem the contrary. The interest in truth,

which may be presumed to have been their only motive when they stated

the proposition alleged to be true, now gives way to the interests of

vanity: and so, for the sake of vanity, what is true must seem false,

and what is false must seem true.

However, this very dishonesty, this persistence in a proposition which

seems false even to ourselves, has something to be said for it. It

often happens that we begin with the firm conviction of the truth

of our statement; but our opponent's argument appears to refute it.

Should we abandon our position at once, we may discover later on

that we were right after all; the proof we offered was false, but

nevertheless there was a proof for our statement which was true. The

argument which would have been our salvation did not occur to us at

the moment. Hence we make it a rule to attack a counter-argument, even

though to all appearances it is true and forcible, in the belief that

its truth is only superficial, and that in the course of the dispute

another argument will occur to us by which we may upset it, or succeed

in confirming the truth of our statement. In this way we are almost

compelled to become dishonest; or, at any rate, the temptation to do

so is very great. Thus it is that the weakness of our intellect and

the perversity of our will lend each other mutual support; and that,

generally, a disputant fights not for truth, but for his proposition,

as though it were a battle _pro aris et focis_. He sets to work _per

fas et nefas_; nay, as we have seen, he cannot easily do otherwise.

As a rule, then, every man will insist on maintaining whatever he

has said, even though for the moment he may consider it false or

doubtful.[1]

[Footnote 1: Machiavelli recommends his Prince to make use of every

moment that his neighbour is weak, in order to attack him; as

otherwise his neighbour may do the same. If honour and fidelity

prevailed in the world, it would be a different matter; but as these

are qualities not to be expected, a man must not practise them

himself, because he will meet with a bad return. It is just the same

in a dispute: if I allow that my opponent is right as soon as he seems

to be so, it is scarcely probable that he will do the same when the

position is reversed; and as he acts wrongly, I am compelled to act

wrongly too. It is easy to say that we must yield to truth, without

any prepossession in favour of our own statements; but we cannot

assume that our opponent will do it, and therefore we cannot do

it either. Nay, if I were to abandon the position on which I had

previously bestowed much thought, as soon as it appeared that he was

right, it might easily happen that I might be misled by a momentary

impression, and give up the truth in order to accept an error.]

To some extent every man is armed against such a procedure by his own

cunning and villainy. He learns by daily experience, and thus comes

to have his own _natural Dialectic_, just as he has his own _natural

Logic_. But his Dialectic is by no means as safe a guide as his Logic.

It is not so easy for any one to think or draw an inference contrary

to the laws of Logic; false judgments are frequent, false conclusions

very rare. A man cannot easily be deficient in natural Logic, but he

may very easily be deficient in natural Dialectic, which is a gift

apportioned in unequal measure. In so far natural Dialectic resembles

the faculty of judgment, which differs in degree with every man; while

reason, strictly speaking, is the same. For it often happens that in

a matter in which a man is really in the right, he is confounded or

refuted by merely superficial arguments; and if he emerges victorious

from a contest, he owes it very often not so much to the correctness

of his judgment in stating his proposition, as to the cunning and

address with which he defended it.

Here, as in all other cases, the best gifts are born with a man;

nevertheless, much may be done to make him a master of this art by

practice, and also by a consideration of the tactics which may be used

to defeat an opponent, or which he uses himself for a similar purpose.

Therefore, even though Logic may be of no very real, practical use,

Dialectic may certainly be so; and Aristotle, too, seems to me to

have drawn up his Logic proper, or Analytic, as a foundation and

preparation for his Dialectic, and to have made this his chief

business. Logic is concerned with the mere form of propositions;

Dialectic, with their contents or matter--in a word, with their

substance. It was proper, therefore, to consider the general form of

all propositions before proceeding to particulars.

Aristotle does not define the object of Dialectic as exactly as I

have done it here; for while he allows that its principal object

is disputation, he declares at the same time that it is also the

discovery of truth.[1] Again, he says, later on, that if, from the

philosophical point of view, propositions are dealt with according to

their truth, Dialectic regards them according to their plausibility,

or the measure in which they will win the approval and assent of

others.[2] He is aware that the objective truth of a proposition must

be distinguished and separated from the way in which it is pressed

home, and approbation won for it; but he fails to draw a sufficiently

sharp distinction between these two aspects of the matter, so as to

reserve Dialectic for the latter alone.[3] The rules which he often

gives for Dialectic contain some of those which properly belong to

Logic; and hence it appears to me that he has not provided a clear

solution of the problem.

[Footnote 1: _Topica_, bk. i., 2.]

[Footnote 2: _Ib_., 12.]

[Footnote 3: On the other hand, in his book _De Sophisticis Elenchis_,

he takes too much trouble to separate _Dialectic_ from _Sophistic_

and _Eristic_, where the distinction is said to consist in this, that

dialectical conclusions are true in their form and their contents,

while sophistical and eristical conclusions are false.

Eristic so far differs from Sophistic that, while the master of

Eristic aims at mere victory, the Sophist looks to the reputation,

and with it, the monetary rewards which he will gain. But whether a

proposition is true in respect of its contents is far too uncertain a

matter to form the foundation of the distinction in question; and

it is a matter on which the disputant least of all can arrive at

certainty; nor is it disclosed in any very sure form even by the

result of the disputation. Therefore, when Aristotle speaks of

_Dialectic_, we must include in it Sophistic, Eristic, and Peirastic,

and define it as "the art of getting the best of it in a dispute," in

which, unquestionably, the safest plan is to be in the right to begin

with; but this in itself is not enough in the existing disposition

of mankind, and, on the other hand, with the weakness of the human

intellect, it is not altogether necessary. Other expedients are

required, which, just because they are unnecessary to the attainment

of objective truth, may also be used when a man is objectively in the

wrong; and whether or not this is the case, is hardly ever a matter of

complete certainty.

I am of opinion, therefore, that a sharper distinction should be drawn

between Dialectic and Logic than Aristotle has given us; that to Logic

we should assign objective truth as far as it is merely formal, and

that Dialectic should be confined to the art of gaining one's point,

and contrarily, that Sophistic and Eristic should not be distinguished

from Dialectic in Aristotle's fashion, since the difference which he

draws rests on objective and material truth; and in regard to what

this is, we cannot attain any clear certainty before discussion; but

we are compelled, with Pilate, to ask, _What is truth_? For truth

is in the depths, [Greek: en butho hae halaetheia] (a saying of

Democritus, _Diog. Laert_., ix., 72). Two men often engage in a warm

dispute, and then return to their homes each of the other's opinion,

which he has exchanged for his own. It is easy to say that in every

dispute we should have no other aim than the advancement of truth; but

before dispute no one knows where it is, and through his opponent's

arguments and his own a man is misled.]

We must always keep the subject of one branch of knowledge quite

distinct from that of any other. To form a clear idea of the province

of Dialectic, we must pay no attention to objective truth, which is an

affair of Logic; we must regard it simply as _the art of getting the

best of it in a dispute_, which, as we have seen, is all the easier if

we are actually in the right. In itself Dialectic has nothing to do

but to show how a man may defend himself against attacks of every

kind, and especially against dishonest attacks; and, in the

same fashion, how he may attack another man's statement without

contradicting himself, or generally without being defeated. The

discovery of objective truth must be separated from the art of winning

acceptance for propositions; for objective truth is an entirely

different matter: it is the business of sound judgment, reflection and

experience, for which there is no special art.

Such, then, is the aim of Dialectic. It has been defined as the Logic

of appearance; but the definition is a wrong one, as in that case it

could only be used to repel false propositions. But even when a man

has the right on his side, he needs Dialectic in order to defend and

maintain it; he must know what the dishonest tricks are, in order to

meet them; nay, he must often make use of them himself, so as to beat

the enemy with his own weapons.

Accordingly, in a dialectical contest we must put objective truth

aside, or, rather, we must regard it as an accidental circumstance,

and look only to the defence of our own position and the refutation of

our opponent's.

In following out the rules to this end, no respect should be paid to

objective truth, because we usually do not know where the truth lies.

As I have said, a man often does not himself know whether he is in the

right or not; he often believes it, and is mistaken: both sides often

believe it. Truth is in the depths. At the beginning of a contest each

man believes, as a rule, that right is on his side; in the course of

it, both become doubtful, and the truth is not determined or confirmed

until the close.

Dialectic, then, need have nothing to do with truth, as little as the

fencing master considers who is in the right when a dispute leads to a

duel. Thrust and parry is the whole business. Dialectic is the art of

intellectual fencing; and it is only when we so regard it that we can

erect it into a branch of knowledge. For if we take purely objective

truth as our aim, we are reduced to mere Logic; if we take the

maintenance of false propositions, it is mere Sophistic; and in either

case it would have to be assumed that we were aware of what was true

and what was false; and it is seldom that we have any clear idea of

the truth beforehand. The true conception of Dialectic is, then, that

which we have formed: it is the art of intellectual fencing used for

the purpose of getting the best of it in a dispute; and, although the

name _Eristic_ would be more suitable, it is more correct to call it

controversial Dialectic, _Dialectica eristica_.

Dialectic in this sense of the word has no other aim but to reduce

to a regular system and collect and exhibit the arts which most men

employ when they observe, in a dispute, that truth is not on their

side, and still attempt to gain the day. Hence, it would be very

inexpedient to pay any regard to objective truth or its advancement in

a science of Dialectic; since this is not done in that original and

natural Dialectic innate in men, where they strive for nothing but

victory. The science of Dialectic, in one sense of the word, is mainly

concerned to tabulate and analyse dishonest stratagems, in order that

in a real debate they may be at once recognised and defeated. It is

for this very reason that Dialectic must admittedly take victory, and

not objective truth, for its aim and purpose.

I am not aware that anything has been done in this direction,

although I have made inquiries far and wide.[1] It is, therefore, an

uncultivated soil. To accomplish our purpose, we must draw from our

experience; we must observe how in the debates which often arise in

our intercourse with our fellow-men this or that stratagem is employed

by one side or the other. By finding out the common elements in tricks

repeated in different forms, we shall be enabled to exhibit certain

general stratagems which may be advantageous, as well for our own use,

as for frustrating others if they use them.

[Footnote 1: Diogenes Laertes tells us that among the numerous

writings on Rhetoric by Theophrastus, all of which have been lost,

there was one entitled [Greek: Agonistikon taes peri tous eristikous

gogous theorias.] That would have been just what we want.]

What follows is to be regarded as a first attempt.

THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC.

First of all, we must consider the essential nature of every dispute:

what it is that really takes place in it.

Our opponent has stated a thesis, or we ourselves,--it is all one.

There are two modes of refuting it, and two courses that we may

pursue.

I. The modes are (1) _ad rem_, (2) _ad hominem_ or _ex concessis_.

That is to say: We may show either that the proposition is not in

accordance with the nature of things, i.e., with absolute, objective

truth; or that it is inconsistent with other statements or admissions

of our opponent, i.e., with truth as it appears to him. The latter

mode of arguing a question produces only a relative conviction, and

makes no difference whatever to the objective truth of the matter.

II. The two courses that we may pursue are (1) the direct, and (2) the

indirect refutation. The direct attacks the reason for the thesis; the

indirect, its results. The direct refutation shows that the thesis is

not true; the indirect, that it cannot be true.

The direct course admits of a twofold procedure. Either we may

show that the reasons for the statement are false (_nego majorem,

minorem_); or we may admit the reasons or premisses, but show that the

statement does not follow from them (_nego consequentiam)_; that is,

we attack the conclusion or form of the syllogism.

The direct refutation makes use either of the _diversion_ or of the

_instance_.

_(a)_ The _diversion_.--We accept our opponent's proposition as true,

and then show what follows from it when we bring it into connection

with some other proposition acknowledged to be true. We use the two

propositions as the premisses of a syllogism giving a conclusion which

is manifestly false, as contradicting either the nature of things,[1]

or other statements of our opponent himself; that is to say, the

conclusion is false either _ad rem_ or _ad hominem_.[2] Consequently,

our opponent's proposition must have been false; for, while true

premisses can give only a true conclusion, false premisses need not

always give a false one.

[Footnote 1: If it is in direct contradiction with a perfectly

undoubted, truth, we have reduced our opponent's position _ad

absurdum_.]

[Footnote 2: Socrates, in _Hippia Maj. et alias_.]

_(B) The instance_, or the example to the contrary.--This consists in

refuting the general proposition by direct reference to particular

cases which are included in it in the way in which it is stated, but

to which it does not apply, and by which it is therefore shown to be

necessarily false.

Such is the framework or skeleton of all forms of disputation; for to

this every kind of controversy may be ultimately reduced. The whole of

a controversy may, however, actually proceed in the manner described,

or only appear to do so; and it may be supported by genuine or

spurious arguments. It is just because it is not easy to make out

the truth in regard to this matter, that debates are so long and so

obstinate.

Nor can we, in ordering the argument, separate actual from apparent

truth, since even the disputants are not certain about it beforehand.

Therefore I shall describe the various tricks or stratagems without

regard to questions of objective truth or falsity; for that is a

matter on which we have no assurance, and which cannot be determined

previously. Moreover, in every disputation or argument on any subject

we must agree about something; and by this, as a principle, we must be

willing to judge the matter in question. We cannot argue with those

who deny principles: _Contra negantem principia non est disputandum_.

STRATAGEMS.

I.

The _Extension_.--This consists in carrying your opponent's

proposition beyond its natural limits; in giving it as general a

signification and as wide a sense as possible, so as to exaggerate it;

and, on the other hand, in giving your own proposition as restricted

a sense and as narrow limits as you can, because the more general a

statement becomes, the more numerous are the objections to which it is

open. The defence consists in an accurate statement of the point or

essential question at issue.

Example 1.--I asserted that the English were supreme in drama. My

opponent attempted _to_ give an instance to the contrary, and replied

that it was a well-known fact that in music, and consequently in

opera, they could do nothing at all. I repelled the attack by

reminding him that music was not included in dramatic art, which

covered tragedy and comedy alone. This he knew very well. What he had

done was to try to generalise my proposition, so that it would apply

to all theatrical representations, and, consequently, to opera and

then to music, in order to make certain of defeating me. Contrarily,

we may save our proposition by reducing it within narrower limits

than we had first intended, if our way of expressing it favours this

expedient.

Example 2.--A. declares that the Peace of 1814 gave back their

independence to all the German towns of the Hanseatic League. B. gives

an instance to the contrary by reciting the fact that Dantzig, which

received its independence from Buonaparte, lost it by that Peace. A.

saves himself thus: "I said 'all German towns,' and Dantzig was in

Poland."

This trick was mentioned by Aristotle in the _Topica_ (bk. viii., cc.

11, 12).

Example 3.--Lamarck, in his _Philosophic Zoologique_ (vol. i., p.

208), states that the polype has no feeling, because it has no nerves.

It is certain, however, that it has some sort of perception; for it

advances towards light by moving in an ingenious fashion from branch

to branch, and it seizes its prey. Hence it has been assumed that its

nervous system is spread over the whole of its body in equal measure,

as though it were blended with it; for it is obvious that the polype

possesses some faculty of perception without having any separate

organs of sense. Since this assumption refutes Lamarck's position, he

argues thus: "In that case all parts of its body must be capable of

every kind of feeling, and also of motion, of will, of thought. The

polype would have all the organs of the most perfect animal in every

point of its body; every point could see, smell, taste, hear, and so

on; nay, it could think, judge, and draw conclusions; every particle

of its body would be a perfect animal and it would stand higher than

man, as every part of it would possess all the faculties which man

possesses only in the whole of him. Further, there would be no reason

for not extending what is true of the polype to all monads, the most

imperfect of all creatures, and ultimately to the plants, which are

also alive, etc., etc." By using dialectical tricks of this kind a

writer betrays that he is secretly conscious of being in the wrong.

Because it was said that the creature's whole body is sensitive to

light, and is therefore possessed of nerves, he makes out that its

whole body is capable of thought.

II.

The _Homonymy_.--This trick is to extend a proposition to something

which has little or nothing in common with the matter in question but

the similarity of the word; then to refute it triumphantly, and so

claim credit for having refuted the original statement.

It may be noted here that synonyms are two words for the same

conception; homonyms, two conceptions which are covered by the same

word. (See Aristotle, _Topica_, bk. i., c. 13.) "Deep," "cutting,"

"high," used at one moment of bodies at another of tones, are

homonyms; "honourable" and "honest" are synonyms.

This is a trick which may be regarded as identical with the sophism

_ex homonymia_; although, if the sophism is obvious, it will deceive

no one.

_Every light can be extinguished.

The intellect is a light.

Therefore it can be extinguished_.

Here it is at once clear that there are four terms in the syllogism,

"light" being used both in a real and in a metaphorical sense. But if

the sophism takes a subtle form, it is, of course, apt to mislead,

especially where the conceptions which are covered by the same word

are related, and inclined to be interchangeable. It is never subtle

enough to deceive, if it is used intentionally; and therefore cases of

it must be collected from actual and individual experience.

It would be a very good thing if every trick could receive some short

and obviously appropriate name, so that when a man used this or that

particular trick, he could be at once reproached for it.

I will give two examples of the homonymy.

Example 1.--A.: "You are not yet initiated into the mysteries of the

Kantian philosophy."

B.: "Oh, if it's mysteries you're talking of, I'll have nothing to do

with them."

Example 2.--I condemned the principle involved in the word _honour_

as a foolish one; for, according to it, a man loses his honour by

receiving an insult, which he cannot wipe out unless he replies with a

still greater insult, or by shedding his adversary's blood or his own.

I contended that a man's true honour cannot be outraged by what he

suffers, but only and alone by what he does; for there is no saying

what may befall any one of us. My opponent immediately attacked

the reason I had given, and triumphantly proved to me that when a

tradesman was falsely accused of misrepresentation, dishonesty, or

neglect in his business, it was an attack upon his honour, which in

this case was outraged solely by what he suffered, and that he could

only retrieve it by punishing his aggressor and making him retract.

Here, by a homonymy, he was foisting _civic honour_, which is

otherwise called _good name_, and which may be outraged by libel and

slander, on to the conception of _knightly honour_, also called _point

d'honneur_, which may be outraged by insult. And since an attack on

the former cannot be disregarded, but must be repelled by public

disproof, so, with the same justification, an attack on the latter

must not be disregarded either, but it must be defeated by still

greater insult and a duel. Here we have a confusion of two essentially

different things through the homonymy in the word _honour_, and a

consequent alteration of the point in dispute.

III.

Another trick is to take a proposition which is laid down relatively,

and in reference to some particular matter, as though it were uttered

with a general or absolute application; or, at least, to take it in

some quite different sense, and then refute it. Aristotle's example is

as follows:

A Moor is black; but in regard to his teeth he is white; therefore, he

is black and not black at the same moment. This is an obvious sophism,

which will deceive no one. Let us contrast it with one drawn from

actual experience.

In talking of philosophy, I admitted that my system upheld the

Quietists, and commended them. Shortly afterwards the conversation

turned upon Hegel, and I maintained that his writings were mostly

nonsense; or, at any rate, that there were many passages in them where

the author wrote the words, and it was left to the reader to find a

meaning for them. My opponent did not attempt to refute this assertion

_ad rem_, but contented himself by advancing the _argumentum ad

hominem_, and telling me that I had just been praising the Quietists,

and that they had written a good deal of nonsense too.

This I admitted; but, by way of correcting him, I said that I had

praised the Quietists, not as philosophers and writers, that is to

say, for their achievements in the sphere of _theory_, but only as

men, and for their conduct in mere matters of _practice_; and that in

Hegel's case we were talking of theories. In this way I parried the

attack.

The first three tricks are of a kindred character. They have this

in common, that something different is attacked from that which was

asserted. It would therefore be an _ignoratio elenchi_ to allow

oneself to be disposed of in such a manner.

For in all the examples that I have given, what the opponent says is

true, but it stands in apparent and not in real contradiction with the

thesis. All that the man whom he is attacking has to do is to deny the

validity of his syllogism; to deny, namely, the conclusion which he

draws, that because his proposition is true, ours is false. In this

way his refutation is itself directly refuted by a denial of his

conclusion, _per negationem consequentiae_. Another trick is to refuse

to admit true premisses because of a foreseen conclusion. There are

two ways of defeating it, incorporated in the next two sections.

Full text of essay http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10731/10731-8.txt

Edited August 18, 2008 by roger

[leroy]

errrr sorry but thats wrong

[Guest roger]

errrr sorry but thats wrong

you could take the view that it is a defense manual, against sophistry & rhetoric...

[Culchi]

Arthur Schopenhauer might take the view you just plagorised his entire book Roger - going by the length of that post. (sorry).

[Guest Dr Benways Assistant]

He wont mind

'Its contents are drawn entirely from his posthumous papers. A

selection of them was given to the world some three of four years

after his death by his friend and literary executor'

He's dead too so fuck him.

This will come in quite handy I reckon, only read the first stratagem so far and is very relevant. Peopl who find some of the arguments on here frustrating would like it.

[Guest roger]

He wont mind

'Its contents are drawn entirely from his posthumous papers. A

selection of them was given to the world some three of four years

after his death by his friend and literary executor'

He's dead too so fuck him.

This will come in quite handy I reckon, only read the first stratagem so far and is very relevant. Peopl who find some of the arguments on here frustrating would like it.

I brought a copy of this yesterday, but I thought that it would be interesting to share, it helps classify bullshit arguments - If I had machiavellian intent I'd not have posted it

[Father McPot]

Love to read (or try to read) this essay, but I just can't read essays/novels from a computer.

[Guest Dr Benways Assistant]

Hey Rog check this one out http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mat...ents.html#iknow it's about arguing with Christians but the basic arguments can be used against all number of silly ideas.

With these two documents it should be easy to come out on top in most argument on this board, as long as you're right that is. I just used it in an argument with some anti-sciance types and it worked well. Remember folks an argument is not a fight.

Edited August 20, 2008 by Dr Benways Assistant

[Guest roger]

Hey Rog check this one out http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mat...ents.html#iknow it's about arguing with Christians but the basic arguments can be used against all number of silly ideas.

With these two documents it should be easy to come out on top in most argument on this board, as long as you're right that is. I just used it in an argument with some anti-sciance types and it worked well. Remember folks an argument is not a fight.

cheers I'll take a look!

btw, in my original post, he doesn't care if you are right or not, only that you win That's not my aim when chatting on there, believe it or not!

[Guest Dr Benways Assistant]

Hehehe, the winner is always right!

[Guest roger]

once I had a full on argument with a twat in the pub he said "all classical music is better than modern music" it went on for ever and I was pissed.

"what do you mean by better, & is that objective or subjective....?

Edited August 20, 2008 by roger

[Guest roger]

A straw [or a fictional cannabist view of a weedman? ] man argument is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position. To "set up a straw man," one describes a position that superficially resembles an opponent's actual view, yet is easier to refute. Then, one attributes that position to the opponent. For example, someone might deliberately overstate the opponent's position. While a straw man argument may work as a rhetorical technique—and succeed in persuading people—it carries little or no real evidential weight, since the opponent's actual argument has not been refuted.

The term is derived from the practice in ages past of using human-shaped straw dummies in combat training. In such training, a scarecrow is made in the image of the enemy, sometimes dressed in an enemy uniform or decorated in some way to vaguely resemble them. A trainee then attacks the dummy with a weapon such as a sword, club, bow or musket. Such a target is, naturally, immobile and does not fight back, and is therefore not a realistic test of skill compared to a live and armed opponent. It is occasionally called a straw dog fallacy, scarecrow argument, or wooden dummy argument. In the UK, it is sometimes called Aunt Sally, with reference to a traditional fairground game.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man

[Guest daviie]

I think Roger, it's called cerebral masturbation. Try life Roger, it's much more fun, and possibly just a bit more honest.

[Guest roger]

I think Roger, it's called cerebral masturbation. Try life Roger, it's much more fun, and possibly just a bit more honest.

I'm just sharing some reading material that might of been of interest to somebody, if this thread bothers you, don't bother reading it any more; if you are looking for a fight - you win, I concede.

[Guest Dr Benways Assistant]

if you are looking for a fight - you win, I concede.

Oh the irony! ******....

Edited December 3, 2008 by Dr Benways Assistant